Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNentjes A
dc.contributor.authorBoom JT
dc.contributor.authorDijkstra BT
dc.contributor.authorKoster M
dc.contributor.authorWoerdman E
dc.contributor.authorZhang ZX
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-12T15:21:45Z
dc.date.available2012-12-12T15:21:45Z
dc.date.issued2002-03-01
dc.identifier410200093
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10029/257243
dc.description.abstractAbstract niet beschikbaar
dc.description.abstractInternational emissions trading between private parties established in Annex B countries requires international linkage of national schemes of emissions trading. The report presents a design for national emission trading schemes and rules for linking them to form an international scheme. A national and international cap and trade scheme as well as a credit trading scheme based on performance standards have been worked out. Next to design issues the market performance and political acceptation of types of national and international emission trading are discussed. A major conclusion trading is that cap and trade is the most effective and efficient national and international option, but credit trade is politically more feasible. The conditions for adequate functioning of tradeable permit schemes as well as potential market failures (high transaction cost, abuse of market power and non cost minimizing behaviour) have been assessed. As a potential type of international market failure the abuse of emission trading schemes as instrument of trade policy has been identified. The question whether differences in national permit schemes could distort international competition on product markets is also discussed. Next to that the arguments for and against and the restriction on flexibility proposed by the EU until July 2001 are analysed and the impact of such a restriction on market performance. Key words: emission trading, flexibility instruments and climate change policy instruments.
dc.description.sponsorshipSG-NOP
dc.format.extent400 p
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherDepartment of Economics and Public Finance
dc.publisherGroningen University
dc.relation.ispartofGlobal Change NOP-NRP report 410200093
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/410200093.html
dc.subject04nl
dc.subjectemissiesnl
dc.subjectbroeikasgassennl
dc.subjectemissierechtennl
dc.subjecthandelnl
dc.subjectemissionen
dc.subjectgreenhouse gasesen
dc.subjectemission rightsen
dc.subjecttradeen
dc.titleNational and International emissions trading for greenhouse gasesen
dc.title.alternativeNationale en internationale emissiehandel van broeikasgassennl
dc.typeReport
dc.contributor.departmentNOP
dc.date.updated2012-12-12T15:21:46Z
html.description.abstractAbstract niet beschikbaar
html.description.abstractInternational emissions trading between private parties established in Annex B countries requires international linkage of national schemes of emissions trading. The report presents a design for national emission trading schemes and rules for linking them to form an international scheme. A national and international cap and trade scheme as well as a credit trading scheme based on performance standards have been worked out. Next to design issues the market performance and political acceptation of types of national and international emission trading are discussed. A major conclusion trading is that cap and trade is the most effective and efficient national and international option, but credit trade is politically more feasible. The conditions for adequate functioning of tradeable permit schemes as well as potential market failures (high transaction cost, abuse of market power and non cost minimizing behaviour) have been assessed. As a potential type of international market failure the abuse of emission trading schemes as instrument of trade policy has been identified. The question whether differences in national permit schemes could distort international competition on product markets is also discussed. Next to that the arguments for and against and the restriction on flexibility proposed by the EU until July 2001 are analysed and the impact of such a restriction on market performance. Key words: emission trading, flexibility instruments and climate change policy instruments.


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record